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THE COMMON LAW CONSTITUTION AT WORK: R (ON THE APPLICATION OF 
UNISON) V LORD CHANCELLOR 
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Abstract: This note considers the radical significance of Supreme Court’s judgment in R (On 
the Application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor on the unlawfulness of tribunal fees. It argues 
that the decision marks the coming of age of the ‘common law constitution at work’. The 
radical potential of UNISON lies in its potential to generate horizontal legal effects in disputes 
between private parties. Recent litigation on employment status in the Gig Economy is 
analysed through the lens of UNISON and common law fundamental rights. The note identifies 
the various ways in which the common law tests of employment status might be 
‘constitutionalised’ in the light of UNISON. 
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The Common Law Constitution at Work and the Principles of Public Law 
 
In July 2017, the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) handed down a decision of high 
constitutional importance in R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (UNISON).1 
                                                          
1 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. I am indebted to the following Blog posts and forthcoming 
articles, which responded to the ramifications of this case rapidly and impressively: M. Elliott, ‘UNISON in the 
Supreme Court: Tribunal Fees, Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law’ 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2017/07/26/unison-in-the-supreme-court-employment-fees-constitutional-
Commented [ALB1]: This should be an A heading 
  
The UKSC struck down the tribunal fees regime as unlawful. In a powerful judgment that 
attracted the concurrence of the seven Justices, Lord Reed set out the principal ground of 
unlawfulness, which was its infringement of the constitutional right of access to the courts.2 
This fundamental constitutional right was described as ‘inherent in the rule of law’, a 
constitutional principle of great significance in the English common law.3 The practical effect 
of the Fees Order, as experienced in the real lives of workers, was the effective prevention of 
their access to a court. UNISON now stands as testament to the vitality of the ‘common law 
constitution’, that is, ‘the ideas and values of which the rule of law consists are reflected and 
embedded in the ordinary common law.’4  
The tribunal fee regime was implemented by the Coalition Government in 2013. It followed 
the publication of a Ministry of Justice consultation paper in January 2011 setting out the 
Government’s intention to implement fees for Employment Tribunal (ET) and Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT) claims.5  Tribunal claims dropped off a cliff following its introduction.6 
The pattern of precipitous decline was certainly clear by the time of the second hearing in the 
Divisional Court.7 The rapid and drastic real-world impact of tribunal fees was probably 
beyond even the wildest dreams of its most fervent political supporters. Lord Reed concluded 
that ‘there has been a dramatic and persistent fall in the number of claims brought in ETs…of 
the order of 66-70%’.8 Furthermore, the remission scheme had not worked as expected, with 
the ‘proportion of claimants receiving remission…far lower than had been anticipated.’9 The 
Lord Chancellor’s discretionary power to remit fees had been exercised only rarely.10 The 
UKSC also referred to an Advisory, conciliation and arbitration service (Acas) survey, 
                                                          
rights-and-the-rule-of-law/; M. Ford QC, ‘It’s the Common Law wot won it’ http://www.ier.org.uk/blog/its-
common-law-wot-won-it (last accessed 7th December 2017); M. Ford QC, ‘Employment Tribunals and the Rule 
of Law: R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor in the Supreme Court’ ILJ (forthcoming, 2018). 
2 The UKSC also concluded that the Fees Order breached EU law and the principle of effective judicial 
protection. There was also a separate judgment by Lady Hale that offered a valuable critique of the Fees Order 
on the basis of indirect sex discrimination, in which all of the Justices concurred. This piece will focus on the 
common law arguments. 
3 UNISON n 1 above, [66]. 
4 T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: OUP, 
1993) 4. 
5 Ministry of Justice, Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal  
(December 2011). 
6 For early academic criticism of the fees regime, see K.D. Ewing and J . Hendy QC, ‘Unfair Dismissal Law 
Changes: Unfair?’ (2012) 41 ILJ 115. 
7 [2014] EWHC 4198 (Admin); [2015] CMLR 4. 
8 UNISON n 1 above, [39]. 
9 UNISON n 1 above, [43]. 
10 UNISON n 1 above, [44]. 
  
published in 2015,11 which found that a significant number of claimants did not pursue legal 
claims because of the practical unaffordability of fees.12  
The UKSC judgment in UNISON was surprising in two respects. The first surprise was in its 
outcome. Prior to the judgment, UNISON had lost twice in the Divisional Court and once in 
the Court of Appeal. Few would have predicted the dramatic turn in fortunes in UKSC. In the 
lower courts, no judge had been prepared to leap the slender evidential gap between the 
aggregate statistics on tribunal claims to the unaffordability of the fees for individual claimants. 
Since the behavioural pattern might be explained on the basis that claimants were unwilling, 
as opposed to unable to pay, the principle of effectiveness in EU law was not breached. By 
contrast, the UKSC brought a dose of realism to its task, and this was reflected in a less 
formalistic approach to the empirical evidence.  
The second surprise was the character of the legal arguments relied upon to challenge the 
lawfulness of the Fees Order. Prior to the UKSC judgment, legal arguments had focused on the 
‘principle of effectiveness’ in EU law, supported by the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). In the UKSC, by contrast, the common law was positioned centre-stage in the 
challenge to the legality of the Fees Order. EU and ECHR principles played a supporting role 
to fundamental common law principles. As Lord Reed observed, ‘before this court, it has been 
recognised that the right of access to justice is not an idea recently imported from the continent 
of Europe, but has long been deeply embedded in our constitutional law. The case has therefore 
been argued primarily on the basis of the common law right of access to justice’.13 While the 
substantive overlap between the common law right and the principles of EU law had already 
been noted in both the Divisional Court14 and the Court of Appeal,15 the priority accorded to 
the common law in the UKSC was striking. 
                                                          
11 UNISON n 1 above, [45] - [46], discussing Acas, Evaluation of Acas Early Conciliation 2015 (2015). 
12 UNISON n 1 above, [46]. 
13 UNISON n 1 above, [64]. 
14 UNISON n 7 above. Elias LJ observed (at [24]) that the EU principle of effectiveness ‘is closely related to the 
common law principle that access to a court is a fundamental right, and also to art. 6 of the ECHR which confers 
a right to a fair and public hearing.’ 
15 [2015] EWCA Civ 935; [2016] 1 CMLR 25. In discussing domestic authorities concerned with measures 
posing a ‘real risk’ to access to justice, Underhill LJ observed (at [51]) that ‘In none of those decisions was the 
alleged unfairness or denial of access to justice formulated in terms of a breach of EU law or of Convention 
rights as such: the claimants relied straightforwardly on common law principles. But  I do not see that as a matter 
of principle the particular source of the unlawfulness can make any difference.’  
  
The basic structure of public law reasoning in the ‘common law constitution’ was set out by 
Lord Reed in the following way: ‘In determining the extent of the power conferred on the Lord 
Chancellor by section 42 (1) of the 2007 Act, the court must consider not only the text of that 
provision, but also the constitutional principles which underlie the text, and the principles of 
statutory interpretation which give effect to those principles.’16 The proper approach, according 
to Lord Reed, was that ‘the Fees Order will be ultra vires if there is a real risk that persons will 
be effectively prevented from having access to justice. That will be so because section 42 of 
the 2007 Act contains no words authorising the prevention of access to the relevant tribunals.’17 
The novelty of this constitutional principle should not be over-stated. Older cases such as 
Raymond v Honey18 and Pyx Granite Co. v Ministry of Housing and Local Government19 may 
be understood as giving effect to it.  
UNISON nevertheless represents an important reaffirmation of the common law principles 
which underpin and shape the process of statutory interpretation in determining vires. Indeed, 
the application of these principles in UNISON mirrors Elliott’s characterisation of the basic 
structure of the common law approach to protecting constitutional rights: ‘the common law 
approach – encapsulated in the so-called principle of legality – discloses three particular, 
closely related strands…conceptual reliance upon ultra vires reasoning; recourse to statutory 
construction as a primary vehicle for protection; and the provision of meaningful justificatory 
scrutiny.’20 Each of these interlocking elements came together to form the basic legal crux of 
common law scrutiny in UNISON. It was unsurprising, therefore, that Lord Reed made 
extensive supportive references to common law authorities such as R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, ex p Leech,21 R (Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,22 
and R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham.23 
The nature of the ‘common law constitution’ in UNISON is captured in T.R.S. Allan’s 
formulation of the relevant constitutional norm:  ‘The strength of this constitutional right [of 
access to a court] justifies a strong presumption of parliamentary intent whereby statutory 
provisions restricting access to the courts are to be narrowly construed…There may well be 
                                                          
16 UNISON n 1 above, [65]. 
17 UNISON n 1 above, [87]. 
18 [1983] 1 AC 1. 
19 [1960] AC 260. 
20 See M. Elliott, ‘Beyond the European Convention: Human Rights and the Common Law’ (2015) 68 CLP  85, 
97. 
21 [1994] QB 198. 
22 [2001] UKHL 26; [2001] 2 AC 532. 
23 [1998] QB 575. 
  
constitutional limits even to the power of “clear words” to deny the citizen’s right to seek justice 
in the courts.’24 Where primary legislation authorized intrusion on the right of access to justice, 
Lord Reed observed that even this was subject to an implied limitation shaped by 
proportionality-style reasoning.25   
In UNISON, Lord Reed elucidated the rule of law as a common good for citizens in the polity. 
As such, access to a court is itself a fundamental right contributing to a public good, not merely 
a private amenity for individuals to pursue their legal grievances. As Lord Reed put it, ‘People 
and businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able to enforce their rights if 
they have to do so, and, on the other hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is 
likely to be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins everyday economic 
and social relations.’26 This reflects an ideal of the rule of law as protecting the liberty of 
citizens under a system of constitutional government. The law must be ‘reliably enforced and 
fairly and consistently applied’ so that civic independence is assured.27 The common law’s 
concern with freedom as independence is especially acute for employees and workers, for 
ineffective systemic enforcement entails that ‘the party in the stronger bargaining position will 
always prevail.’28 
These constitutional principles emboldened the UKSC to approach the available evidence 
differently to the lower courts. The test for whether the Fees Order was ultra vires was whether 
there was a ‘real risk’ that claimants would ‘effectively be prevented’ from having access to 
the court.29 This displayed a welcome sensitivity to the real world occupied by workers. As 
such, the formula of ‘real risk’ meant that it was not necessary to adduce ‘conclusive evidence’ 
that people were prevented from bringing claims. The aggregate data was sufficient to establish 
a fall that was ‘so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant the conclusion that a 
significant number of people who would otherwise have brought claims have found the fees to 
be unaffordable.’30 This was reinforced by Lord Reed’s observation that affordability must be 
                                                          
24 Allan n 4 above, 142-143. 
25 UNISON n 1 above, [88] - [89]. 
26 UNISON n 1 above, [71]. 
27 T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom, Constitution, and Common Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 89. 
This has obvious affinities with republican work on freedom as non-domination, on which see P. Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: OUP, 1997). 
28 UNISON n 1 above, [72]. From a common law constitutionalist perspective, Allan is critical of accounts of the 
rule of law that accord priority to ‘negative liberty’ and ‘negative rights’ (n 27 above, 129). Statutory rights, 
such as are contained in employment protection legislation, are necessary to remedy the demeaning dependence 
that might otherwise obtain in the employment relationship.  
29 UNISON n 1 above, [87] (emphasis added). 
30 UNISON n 1 above, [91]. 
  
decided ‘according to the likely impact of fees on behaviour in the real world.’31 As such, the 
fees needed to be ‘reasonably affordable’, not theoretically affordable.32 Finally, Lord Reed 
drew attention to statutory rights where the corresponding remedies were either low monetary 
awards or even non-pecuniary, such as the right to written statement of terms and conditions. 
In these circumstances, the costs of seeking justice would render its pursuit ‘futile or 
irrational’.33 Even where claimants were seeking to vindicate statutory rights with higher 
monetary awards, the difficulties in predicting a successful outcome, compounded by the 
shocking figures on non-enforcement of ET awards, meant that enforcement was likely 
‘irrational or futile’ in many of these cases too.34 This undermined the public good represented 
by the effective general enforcement of statutory employment rights. 
UNISON is an exemplar of common law constitutionalism. In public law doctrinal terms, how 
radical is it? Four observations are warranted.  
First, the decision in UNISON was reached using well-established common law principles of 
judicial review. In this respect, it did not break new doctrinal ground. Lord Reed’s judgment 
was powerfully expressed, but other judges have arrived at a similar outcome using 
conventional doctrinal techniques.35 Still, UNISON should be welcomed as further entrenching 
the fundamental status of the constitutional right of access to a court. Not all the current 
members of the UKSC share that view. For example, Lord Sumption (who did not sit in 
UNISON) has described Witham as a ‘minor corner of English public law’ that demonstrates 
the damaging transmutation of a political question about the distribution of public resources 
into a legal question about rights.36 In his view, the issues in Witham were non-justiciable. 
Given these powerful regressive signals in extra-judicial writings, we should never take 
orthodox constitutional principles for granted. 
Second, UNISON offers some important insights into fundamental constitutional principles. 
For example, Lord Reed observed that ‘at the heart of the concept of the rule of law is the idea 
that society is governed by law. Parliament exists primarily in order to make laws for society 
                                                          
31 UNISON n 1 above, [93]. 
32 ibid. 
33 UNISON n 1 above, [96]. 
34 In this respect, the important scholarly intervention by A. Adams and J. Prassl should be borne in mind, and it 
is likely to have been influential in shaping the UKSC’s own reasoning: A. Adams and J. Prassl, ‘Vexatious 
Claims: Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal Fees’ (2017) 80 MLR 412. 
35 Chester v Bateson [1920] 1 KB 829. 
36 Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ in N.W. Barber, R. Ekins and P. Yowell (eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits 
of the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 15, 19. 
  
in this country…Courts exist in order to ensure that the laws made by Parliament, and the 
common law created by the courts themselves, are applied and enforced.’37 This may be 
understood, in Kavanagh’s evocative description, as a ‘collaborative conception of the 
separation of powers’.38 It is ‘collaborative’ in identifying the institutional complementarities 
between courts and Parliament in supporting the goals of good legal governance. Collaboration 
is not a byword for quiescence, as the outcome in UNISON itself demonstrates. It may 
sometimes involve the courts vindicating certain core values against other constitutional actors, 
for example protecting the citizen’s fundamental rights against legislative or executive 
encroachment. Nevertheless, the collaborative enterprise of good legal governance sometimes 
involves institutions working together to ensure the systemic effectiveness of legal rights. 
Where citizens enjoy reliable expectations that the law will be respected by others (especially 
the powerful), the equal civic standing of citizens is thereby assured. 
Third, it is tempting to attribute the victory in UNISON to the strategic choice to prioritise the 
common law arguments over the arguments of EU and European human rights law. It should 
nevertheless be recognised that the UKSC also concluded that the Fees Order did breach the 
EU principle of effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, because it imposed limitations on the exercise of EU rights that 
were disproportionate.39 The boundaries of the common law constitution and EU and European 
human rights law were, in this respect, coterminous. 
Finally, the constitutional right of access to a court, along with other rights associated with 
legal protection such as the right of access to legal advice, are already well-established common 
law rights.40 The UKSC did not develop a general analysis of other common law fundamental 
rights. This is understandable, given the nature of the arguments before it, but it represents a 
missed opportunity. For example, some scholars have suggested that ‘fundamental freedoms 
of speech, conscience, and association, together with the right to a fair trial and immunity from 
arbitrary arrest and detention, are integral parts of any legitimate regime’.41 UNISON now 
creates an opening for workers and trade unions to argue for a broader category of common 
                                                          
37 UNISON n 1 above, [68]. 
38 A. Kavanagh, ‘The Role of Courts in the Joint Enterprise of Governing’ in N.W. Barber, R. Ekins and P. Yowell 
(eds), Lord Sumption and the Limits of the Law (Oxford: Hart, 2016) 121, 132. 
39 UNISON n 1 above, [117]. 
40 Elliott n 20 above, 88. 
41 Allan n 27 above, 324. 
  
law fundamental rights.42 They might begin with the fundamental right to freedom of 
association. 
If UNISON is to have radical potential as legal doctrine, it must be somewhere other than in 
public law. It should be acknowledged that many labour lawyers may be sceptical about the 
possibilities for a reconfiguration of ‘private’ common law, even as they acknowledge the 
worker-protective potential of ‘public’ common law.43 In the next section, the possibility of 
UNISON’s ‘horizontal effect’ is examined within the context of ‘employment status’ litigation. 
If, as will be argued, the UNISON principles are developed horizontally, we may yet witness 
the radical potential of the ‘common law constitution at work’. 
 
The Common Law Constitution at Work and ‘Horizontal Effect’ 
 
In the recent EAT decision on the ‘worker’ status of Uber drivers, the EAT explicitly referred 
to the UNISON decision in its reasoning.44 This indicates the horizontal potential of UNISON 
in legal disputes between private parties. Collins has described ‘indirect horizontal effect’ as 
encompassing a range of legal techniques ‘that permits and usually requires a court to consider 
whether the application of fundamental rights to a private law dispute might affect the result, 
at least to the extent of favouring one interpretation of the existing law over another.’45 In my 
view, the entire area of ‘employment status’ could be influenced by the constitutional principles 
in UNISON. The Uber decision indicates how this might happen.  
In Uber, Eady HHJ observed that UNISON recognised that ‘the imbalance of power between 
the parties in the employment context has informed the introduction of the statutory rights (such 
as minimum wage and working time protections) that the Claimants seek to exercise in this 
case’.46 This principle provided powerful normative support to a ‘purposive’ approach to the 
characterisation of work arrangements where there was an inequality of bargaining power 
                                                          
42 I have argued in favour of a doctrine of common law fundamental rights in  employment law, in A. Bogg, 
‘Common Law and Statute in the Law of Employment’ (2016) 69 CLP 67, 100-111. 
43 M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, ‘Common Law and Voice’ in A. Bogg and T. Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: 
Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 352. 
44 Uber B.V. and others v Aslam and others UKEAT/0056/17/DA, [98]. 
45 H. Collins, ‘The Challenges Presented by Fundamental Rights to Private Law’ in K. Barker, K. Fairweather 
and R. Grantham (eds), Private Law in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart, 2017) 213, 214. 
46 Uber n 44 above, [98]. 
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between the parties.47 Tribunals were not constrained by the terms set out in written 
documentation where this did not represent the ‘true agreement’ between the parties. As all 
labour lawyers know, the common law determination of employment status is pivotal to the 
practical question of whether fundamental employment rights enacted through legislation, such 
as basic working time or minimum wage protections, are enforceable. Legal disputes over 
employment status occur at a site where statute law and common law exist cheek by jowl. In 
this way, the question of UNISON’s ‘horizontal’ effect is no longer idle speculation. The EAT 
treated the constitutional principles in UNISON as relevant to the horizontal dispute between 
the Uber drivers and their employer.  
This is unsurprising. Labour law has always been disruptive of the distinction between vertical 
and horizontal application of fundamental rights. The employment relationship is a site where 
‘abuse of power’ can occur, and this implies the relevance of public law principles.48 
Furthermore, Lord Reed explained the special nature of statutory employment rights in 
UNISON: ‘When Parliament passes laws creating employment rights, for example, it does so 
not merely in order to confer benefits on individual employees, but because it has decided that 
it is in the public interest that those rights should be given effect.’49 For example, the right to a 
minimum or living wage might be understood as a right that is justified in part by its 
contribution to a culture of decent work as a public good. This notion of employment rights as 
possessing a public dimension explains why their enforcement is amenable to UNISON 
principles.50 
The following sections defend and develop the argument that UNISON’s radical potential lies 
in its horizontal effect. It will examine the following issues: the ‘horizontal’ implications of 
access to a court and other common law fundamental rights; UNISON as entrenching a common 
law ‘favourability’ principle; and the role of general constitutional principles in directing the 
characterisation of work contracts. 
 
Access to a court and other common law fundamental rights 
                                                          
47 Uber n 44 above, [99]. 
48 J. Laws, ‘Public Law and Employment Law: Abuse of Power’ [1997] PL 455. 
49 UNISON n 1 above, [72]. 
50 For further discussion of the ‘private’ and ‘public’ dimensions of labour rights, from the perspective of 
corrective justice theories, see A. Bogg, ‘Labour, Love and Futility: Philosophical Perspectives on Labour Law’ 
(2017) 33 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations  7, 16-30. 
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In UNISON the UKSC was concerned with vertical interference with access to a court. The 
sceptic might well ask what any of this has to do with the determination of worker status. After 
all, whether X is an employee or worker of Y is a matter that goes to the very definition of the 
primary right. That is to say, the relevant description of the primary right includes the 
individual’s employment status (i.e. an employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed). Where 
X is not an employee or worker under the relevant legal test, her access to a court is not in point 
because she has no primary right. It is only where so-called ‘tertiary’ legal rules are 
concerned,51 such as limitation periods, that it is intelligible to talk in terms of an interference 
with ‘access to a court’. This is because ‘tertiary’ legal rules are directly concerned to regulate 
the access to courts of those who otherwise have primary rights to vindicate. Whereas if an 
element of the primary right is absent, there is no primary right to enforce. 
This scepticism is fortified by the notorious episode of Osman v United Kingdom.52 It will be 
recalled that in Osman the ECtHR found that there had been a violation of Article 6 where a 
claim for negligence against the police had been struck out in the domestic courts. In striking 
out the legal claim, the domestic court had done so on the basis that the police owed no duty 
of care to victims in the circumstances of the case. The ECtHR nevertheless treated the striking 
out as a violation of Article 6. The decision attracted fierce criticism for misunderstanding the 
relevant substantive and procedural national law.53 If there was no common law duty of care, 
there could be no tort of negligence. Procedural rights should not have acoustic effects on the 
substantive law. 
However, in UNISON Lord Reed was keen to emphasise the ‘real world’ of legal rights and 
their enforcement. Once this perspective is adopted, a sharp distinction between process rights 
and substantive rights becomes more difficult to maintain. The realities of employment 
litigation mean that in practice employment status is central to the systemic enforceability of 
statutory employment rights. This is acknowledged in the recent Taylor Review of Modern 
Working Practices, where the discussion of employment status is included in chapter 8 on 
                                                          
51 F. Wilmot-Smith, ‘Illegality as a Rationing Rule’ in S. Green and A. Bogg (eds), Illegality after Patel v Mirza 
(Oxford: Hart, forthcoming 2018). 
52 Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
53 C.A. Gearty, ’Unravelling Osman’ (2001) 64 MLR 159. For more recent discussion, see P. Gil iker, The 
Europeanisation of English Tort Law (Oxford: Hart, 2014) 140-153. 
  
‘Fairer Enforcement’.54 This is an important recognition that the substantive question of 
employment status is also an ‘access to justice’ issue. In its discussion of the practical 
difficulties faced by claimants paying tribunal fees, the report observed:  
 
‘While paying these fees represents a large financial risk, for many, particularly in 
atypical working arrangements, the jeopardy is two-fold. As well as the risk that they 
are not able to prove that they were treated unfairly (in the widest sense depending on 
the right being enforced), they also carry the risk that they are not able to prove they 
are even entitled to bring their claim in the first place because their status is uncertain. 
This is because one of the first things a tribunal will consider is whether the individual 
has the appropriate employment status to bring the case.’55 
 
The analysis in the Taylor Review continues to be germane. The uncertainties around 
employment status, which forces workers to engage in the fraught business of predicting the 
application of complex legal rules to complex factual situations, mean that this will continue 
to be a strategic pressure point for employers resisting statutory claims. It will also persist as a 
practical deterrent to individuals deciding whether to pursue statutory claims against 
employers.  
Collins has argued that the ‘distinction between constitutional structures and processes, on the 
one hand, and substantive rights in private law on the other, is not easy to maintain in 
practice.’56 To support this point, he discusses the impact of a fundamental right to a home for 
consumers challenging repossession orders sought by mortgage lenders.57 In these cases, an 
ostensibly procedural right – the right to a fair trial – has interacted dynamically with the 
fundamental right to a home and the fundamental right to an effective remedy, which in turn 
has had a transformative effect on the legal protection of consumers.58  
                                                          
54 M. Taylor, ‘Good Work; The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices’ (Gov.uk, 2017) available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/627671/good-work-taylor-
review-modern-working-practices-rg.pdf last accessed 26 September 2017 (The Taylor Review). 
55 ibid 61 (emphasis added). 
56 Collins n 45 above, 215. 
57 Case C-34/13 Kusionova v SMART Capital as (2014, CJEU) (not yet reported), discussed Collins n 45 above, 
215. 
58 See also J. Rutgers, ‘The Right to Housing (Article 7 of the Charter) and Unfair Terms in General Conditions’ 
in H. Collins (ed), European Contract Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Cambridge: Intersentia, 
2017) 125. 
  
This suggests that a zealous insistence on the distinction between process and substance can be 
problematic. It is important that the law does not become ossified. Private law doctrines must 
remain permeable to new doctrinal understandings informed by fundamental rights.59 UNISON 
focused its discussion on the fundamental right of access to a court. It is certainly plausible that 
other fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association would be 
protected under the common law. Where employment status disputes arise within the context 
of a claimant seeking to vindicate other fundamental rights protected under employment 
legislation, access to a court is an acute concern. Access to a court should operate as a ‘abstract’ 
right, supporting an inclusive approach to employment status where it is possible to do so given 
the reality of the working arrangements.60 
 
UNISON and the ‘favourability principle’ 
 
The principle of favourability is often treated as alien to common law systems. By contrast, it 
is central to many Civilian systems of labour law. As Freedland and Kountouris explain, in 
some jurisdictions it developed as a ranking principle where there were multiple norm-sources 
regulating personal employment contracts, such as constitutional law, statutes, collective 
agreements, and individual employment contracts.61 In situations of conflicting norms, the 
principle of ‘construction in favour of the worker’, required that the norm most favourable to 
the worker should be applied.62 According to Freedland and Kountouris, the favourability 
principle extends beyond simply providing rules for resolving norm conflicts.63 The 
                                                          
59 For example, Collins raises the question whether the tort of nuisance might be extended to protect the interests 
of parties without a proprietary interest in the land, or whether a new tort might be created, on the basis of the 
fundamental right to a home: see Collins n 45 above, 219-220. A zealous use of the striking out procedure 
would impede the abilities of citizens to get those arguments before a court.  
60 On the distinction between ‘abstract’ rights and ‘concrete’ rights, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(London: Duckworth, 1977) 93, where the distinction is explained in the following way: ‘An abstract right is a 
general political aim the statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighed or 
compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims. The grand rights of political rhetoric are in 
this way abstract.’ We might understand access to a court as an abstract right ope rating with background 
gravitational force in cases of disputed employment status, which inclines the court to a finding of 
employee/worker status where it is possible to do so on the facts. 
61 M. Freedland and N. Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 
186. 
62 ibid 187. 
63 ibid 150. 
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favourability principle could be understood more broadly as favouring the development of 
protective norms to protect the weaker party. 
Historically, the English common law was understood to rest upon the opposite axiom. In 
Kahn-Freund’s oft-cited words:  
‘the law does and to some extent must conceal the realities of subordination behind the 
conceptual screen of contracts considered as concluded between equals. This may 
partly account for the propensity of lawyers to turn a blind eye to the realities of 
distribution of power in society.’64  
In UNISON, Lord Reed observed that,  
‘Relationships between employers and employees are generally characterised by an 
imbalance of economic power. Recognising the vulnerability of employees to 
exploitation, discrimination, and other undesirable practices, and the social problems 
which can result, Parliament has long intervened in those relationships so as to confer 
statutory rights on employees, rather than leaving their rights to be determined by 
freedom of contract.’65  
It followed from this fundamental principle that statutory rights needed to be ‘effective’ and 
‘enforceable in practice’.66 UNISON resolves an important ambiguity in the common law. It 
can no longer be said that judges ‘turn a blind eye’ to the inequalities that abound in 
employment relationships. Judges at the highest level have now openly acknowledged that 
employment contracts are different to ordinary commercial contracts.  
It was sometimes unclear whether these judicial observations were descriptive or normative 
propositions. As a descriptive proposition, the recognition of contractual inequality is simply a 
brute statement of sociological facts, without any necessary normative implications.67 
UNISON, by contrast, adopts a normative understanding, building upon Lord Clarke’s 
                                                          
64 P. L. Davies and M. R. Freedland (eds), Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (London: Stevens, 3rd edition, 
1983) 15. 
 
65 UNISON n 1 above, [6] 
66 ibid. 
67 This is a tenable reading of Lord Hoffmann’s reflections on the special nature of the employment contract  in 
Johnson v Unisys Ltd, within the context of a judgment that blocked the development of protective common law 
norms on the basis of statutory pre-emption. See Johnson v Unisys Ltd [2001] ICR 480, [35]. 
  
interpretive approach in Autoclenz v Belcher (Autoclenz).68 That is to say, the common law’s 
principles and doctrines should be progressively refashioned so as to protect the weaker party 
in the contractual relation. This is reflected in Lord Reed’s acknowledgment of the special role 
of protective employment rights, and the constitutional importance of ensuring their systemic 
effectiveness. It is also reflected in Autoclenz, where this recognition of contractual inequality 
led to a ‘purposive’ approach to the characterisation of personal work contracts.69 After 
UNISON, the favourability principle should no longer be regarded a distinctive feature of 
Civilian labour law systems. It should now be recognised as a common law principle of 
fundamental constitutional significance. 
 
The role of general principles in the construction of contracts 
There appears to be a difference in styles of judicial reasoning in comparing the recent EAT 
decision in Uber and the recent Court of Appeal decision in Pimlico Plumbers.70 In Uber, Eady 
HHJ approached the construction of the specific contractual arrangements through the lens of 
general interpretive principles. Significantly, she appeared to draw a link between UNISON 
and Autoclenz, as a prelude to the court’s interpretive task.71 This meant that ‘the ET was 
required to determine the nature of the relationship between ULL and the drivers for the 
purposes of statutory provisions in the field of employment law; provisions enacted to provide 
protections to those often disadvantaged in any contractual bargain. The ET’s starting point 
was to determine the true nature of the parties’ bargain, having regard to all the 
circumstances.’72 In Pimlico Plumbers, by contrast, Underhill LJ was at pains to particularise 
the nature of the enquiry into the plumbers’ employment status: ‘the resolution of this issue has 
depended on an analysis of the contradictory and ill thought-out contractual paperwork in the 
context of the Judge’s findings about what happened on the ground. That means that although 
employment lawyers will inevitably be interested in this case – the question of when a 
relationship is genuinely casual being a very live one at present – they should be careful about 
trying to draw any very general conclusions from it.’73 
                                                          
68 [2011] UKSC 41. 
69 ibid [35]. 
70 Pimlico Plumbers Ltd and another v Smith (Pimlico Plumbers) [2017] EWCA Civ 51; [2017] ICR 657. 
71 Uber n 44 above, [98]-[99]. 
72 ibid, [105]. 
73 Pimlico Plumbers n 70 above, [143]. 
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It is submitted that there is great virtue in embedding the process of contractual construction 
and characterization within the context of general constitutional principles. The legal 
characterisation of contractual work relations operates within a general framework of 
‘structural principles’. To this end, Mark Freedland has identified a class of ‘structural 
principles’, which function as general legal principles in the common law of employment.74 
These structural principles perform both ‘attributive’ and ‘ascriptive’ roles in the contract of 
employment: ‘attributive’ in shaping the identifying attributes of personal work contracts, and 
‘ascriptive’ in assigning normative obligations to those contracts.75  
For present purposes, the most important of Freedland’s structural principles is the ‘integration 
principle’. Freedland defines it in the following terms: ‘where there is such an exchange or a 
series of exchanges of work and remuneration taking place in the context of a personal work 
relationship, the worker should be regarded and treated as being integrated into the organization 
of the employer or employing enterprise’.76 In its guise as an attributive principle, the 
‘integration principle’ favours the inclusion of personal work arrangements within the domain 
of employment contracts (and hence within the domain of statutory protective rights). UNISON 
provides a constitutionalised underpinning to Freedland’s pro-inclusive ‘integration principle’. 
The favourability principle explains and justifies the enactment of protective statutory rights to 
protect the weaker party. These protective rights require effective systemic enforcement to 
ensure that the rule of law is vindicated. The common law of the personal employment contract 
should be developed purposively, as a ‘collaborative’ exercise in law-making, with the judges 
developing the common law to support protective statutory norms.77 Without this systemic 
perspective on the rule of law, ‘the party in the stronger bargaining position will always 
prevail’.78 It is this basic normative concern that underpins Freedland’s ‘integration’ principle. 
It is increasingly reflected in the evolving legal rules and principles for determining 
employment status. 
The leading authority on the general interpretive approach to employment status is Autoclenz.79 
The car valeters signed comprehensive written contracts that contained ‘terms inconsistent’ 
                                                          
74 M. Freedland, ‘The Legal Structure of the Contract of Employment’ in M. Freedland and others (eds), The 
Contract of Employment (Oxford: OUP, 2016) 28. 
75 ibid, 29-39. 
76 ibid, 42. 
77 Kavanagh n 38 above. 
 
78 UNISON n 1 above, [72]. 
79 Autoclenz n 68 above. 
  
with employment status. If those written terms were contractually valid, the effect would be to 
negate a legal characterization that the car valeters were ‘employees’ or ‘workers’. This would 
have disqualified the individuals from bringing statutory claims under the working time and 
minimum wage legislation. The written contracts had been signed, which as a matter of 
ordinary contract law is generally dispositive: a signatory to a written contract is bound to its 
terms.80 Taking its inspiration from landlord and tenant law and the problem of ‘sham’ 
arrangements, the Supreme Court determined that the written documentation was not the same 
as the ‘true agreement’. In an important statement of principle, Lord Clarke SCJ concluded 
that:  
 
‘the relevant bargaining power of the parties must be taken into account in deciding 
whether the terms of any written agreement in truth represent what was agreed and the 
true agreement will often have to be gleaned from all the circumstances of the case, of 
which the written agreement is only a part. This may be described as a purposive 
approach to the problem.’81 
 
This ‘purposive’ approach to characterization enabled tribunals to disregard ‘terms 
inconsistent’ with employee or worker status in the written documentation if those terms did 
not reflect the reality of the working arrangements. In the words of Eady HHJ in Uber, the 
tribunal should examine ‘all the circumstances’ in determining the ‘true agreement’.82  This 
has led to an attenuation of legal rules that continue to be central and operative in the general 
law of contract, such as the ‘signature rule’. There are some interesting parallels between 
Autoclenz and Collins’ discussion of the interpretation of legal instruments using fundamental 
rights as an interpretive framework.83 Collins’ focus is on the interpretation of wills, to ensure 
their consistency with fundamental rights. His view is that the case law of the ECtHR 
establishes the following interpretive principle: ‘In the absence of detailed and explicit 
terminology to the contrary, there is a presumption that interpretations of private instruments 
will conform to Convention rights.’84  
                                                          
80 L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. 
81 Autoclenz n 68 above, [35] 
82 Uber n 44 above, [105]. 
83 Collins n 45 above, 231-233. 
84 ibid, 233. 
  
Autoclenz can be understood as giving effect to a similar principle for employment contracts, 
though without any corresponding solicitude for ‘detailed and explicit terminology’ in the 
written documentation. The relative strength of the Autoclenz principle can be justified. The 
contract of employment is different to a testamentary instrument in that the legal system has 
opted to use the personal work contract as its chosen platform for allocating fundamental rights 
in protective legislation. In this way, the personal employment contract is not simply a ‘private 
instrument’; it performs a public institutional role through its allocation of employment rights, 
rights that are themselves based in important public goods.85 Furthermore, the putative duty-
bearer in the contractual relation has the opportunity and incentive to draft the contractual 
arrangements in order to circumvent the statutory implementation of fundamental rights. 
In sum, Autoclenz is purposive in the following way. Where it is possible to characterize X as 
an employee or worker on a reasonable construction of the working arrangements, X should be 
characterized as such. The relevant purpose in ‘purposive’ is that of the court, and it is a 
constitutional purpose, which is to support the rule of law through the protection of 
fundamental rights which are implemented through protective employment statutes. This 
supports the systemic dimensions of the rule of law. It also involves little or no cost to the 
individualistic dimensions of the rule of law such as legal certainty, fair warning, predictability, 
and so forth. The legal characterization of the work relation should be congruent with the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. Ideally, neither party should be caught unawares by the 
court’s judgment. In most cases of disputed employment status, it is stretching credulity to 
suggest that the employer has been caught unawares. For example, in Bates van Winkelhof v 
Clyde & Co LLP, Lady Hale SCJ noted that the court had to work very hard to conclude that a 
member of an LLP was not a worker.86 That will often be so in cases of disputed status where 
the actual work practices are conducted on the footing of an employment relationship, whatever 
the technical legal characterization. 
The attentiveness to the ‘real world’ of rights enforcement in UNISON also echoes the 
interpretive approach in Autoclenz, which is to be attentive to the reality of working practices 
in determining the contractual obligations. Autoclenz confirmed that the courts should use an 
‘objective’ approach to the characterisation of the contract. In so doing, Lord Clarke endorsed 
the approach taken by Aikens LJ in the Court of Appeal in Autoclenz.87 Can this continuing 
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adherence to an ‘objective’ approach be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
‘purposive’ interpretation? I think that the two positions can be reconciled. As Chen-Wishart 
explains, ‘objectivity’ in contract can be interpreted in a variety of ways.88 Most importantly, 
‘objectivity’ without more does not discriminate between different perspectival senses of that 
term. It might mean ‘bystander’ objectivity, or objectivity from the perspective of the promisee, 
or objectivity from the perspective of the promisor. The ‘true’ agreement might shift, 
depending upon which perspectival sense of objectivity is being deployed.  
This necessitates a principled choice by the courts to resolve the ambiguity. After Autoclenz 
and UNISON, the appropriate perspective to adopt is ‘worker objectivity’. In other words, the 
court should ask how a reasonable worker would interpret the employer’s conduct in 
determining the contractual obligations between them. This would ensure that the arrangements 
are construed in favour of the protection of the weaker party, which has affinities with the 
contra proferentem rule in general contract law.89 Moreover, and following Autoclenz, this 
perspectival objectivity would be ‘contextual’ rather than ‘formal’, incorporating a 
consideration of the entire factual matrix of the parties’ working arrangements.90 In this way, 
the test remains recognizably contractual. However, the relevant doctrinal techniques are 
developed in the light of general principles such as ‘favourability’. Hence UNISON sharpens 
our understanding of the radical potential of Autoclenz.  
It also supports a different legal approach in situations where there appears to be no contract 
between the parties. Such an approach would have been very welcome in the recent Court of 
Appeal case of Smith v Carillion (JM) Ltd.91 This case constituted an extreme version of the 
status problem, in that there was seemingly no contract at all between the claimant and the 
defendant. Mr Smith had been employed in a triangular agency arrangement in the construction 
industry. It was conceded that the end user had provided information about Mr Smith’s trade 
union activities to a blacklisting organization, the Consulting Association, and that this 
constituted a detriment that had the purpose of penalizing him for taking part in the activities 
of an independent trade union. The claims related to historic discrimination, and at the relevant 
                                                          
88 M. Chen-Wishart, ‘Contractual Mistake, Intention in Formation and Vitiation: the Oxymoron of Smith v 
Hughes’ in J. W. Neyers, R. Bronaugh and S.G.A. Pitel (eds), Exploring Contract Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 
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89 For further discussion, see S. Deakin, ‘Interpreting Employment Contracts: Judges, Employers and Workers’ 
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90 On the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘contextual’ objectivity, see Chen-Wishart n 88 above, 351-355. 
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time, the statutory protection was confined to ‘employees’. Statutory protection was extended 
to the wider category of ‘worker’ in 2004. The Court of Appeal rejected Mr Smith’s appeal. 
There was no contract between the end user and Mr Smith, and the facts did not meet the strict 
common law threshold of necessity in order to imply such a contract at the relevant time.92 Nor 
could the interpretative obligation under the Human Rights Act 1998 be brought into play, to 
the effect that the statutory provision protecting him from detriment should be construed widely 
in light of Mr Smith’s Article 11 and Article 8 rights, because the conduct of the end user 
predated the enactment of that legislation. 
This decision ought to have been approached on the basis of common law fundamental rights. 
In applying the common law necessity test for the implication of a contract, the fundamental 
rights dimension of Carillion should be recognised. The blacklisting of trade unionists is a 
serious violation of the very core of freedom of association. Its consequences were very severe 
in destroying Mr Smith’s ability to secure employment in his chosen occupation. The 
implication of a contract of employment between Mr Smith and the end user was necessary to 
enable Mr Smith to seek protection of his fundamental right to freedom of association. After 
UNISON, the common law test of contractual implication should be relaxed in fundamental 
rights cases. For example, the test of implication might simply require that the facts were 
capable of sustaining the implication of a contract of employment. This would at least have 
given Mr Smith the opportunity to have his day in court and test out the substantive merits of 
his fundamental rights claim, rather than being shut out on a legal technicality. That is an access 
to court issue, in practice even if not in theory. And we now know that it is the practical 
dimension that counts after UNISON. 
 
Legal and Political Constitutionalism 
UNISON may stand as the most important labour law judgment to be handed down by the 
Supreme Court in a generation. Time will tell. It should be acknowledged that the very idea of 
a ‘common law constitution at work’ will be regarded by many as provocative, slightly 
hysterical or perhaps just a very silly claim. The common law has operated as a repressive and 
reactionary political tool to suppress and pacify workers and trade unions. It has often subverted 
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the legislative purposes of protective statutes.93 Its judges are scarcely more representative as 
a group than when J.A.G. Griffith penned the first edition of The Politics of the Judiciary in 
1977.94 We should always be vigilant and wary when the common law is portrayed as a 
progressive alternative. The wisdom of the sceptic cannot easily be parried. History is on her 
side.95 
Against that view, UNISON secured the abolition of tribunal fees where conventional forms of 
political action had failed. For all its strong critical rhetoric,96 it is implausible that the House 
of Commons Justice Committee would have prompted a volte-face by the Government.97 The 
recommendations on tribunal fees in the Taylor Review were exposed as feeble following the 
UNISON judgment.98 The use of constitutional litigation, on the basis of fundamental rights, 
provided a powerful moral language with which to challenge the deep injustice of the tribunal 
fees; and the authoritative nature of legal judgment has been transformative for millions of 
workers at a stroke.  
The enforcement of a fundamental constitutional right simultaneously vindicated the common 
good.  In this respect, UNISON also suggests that many criticisms of ‘labour rights as human 
rights’ (such as the alleged ‘individualism’ of rights discourse) are overblown swipes at a 
parade of strawmen. There is nothing individualistic about the constitutional victory in 
UNISON. Nor is there anything individualistic about its conception of rights or the rule of law. 
Of course, we would fall into a different trap if we were to claim that constitutional litigation 
operates as a complete substitute for political mobilisation. That would simply be to replace 
one set of dogmas for another. There are many ways in which the justice system can be 
undermined, for example by starving the employment tribunals of public resources. Like a 
virus, stealth deregulation mutates rapidly in response to its environment. Political and legal 
strategies must be deployed together in a coordinated way. UNISON marks the beginning of 
the political struggle, not its end. 
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It might also be objected that the common law’s pantheon of fundamental rights is meagre and 
narrow, with even freedom of association occupying an uncertain status when compared with 
the unambiguous language of the ECHR. This is a fair criticism. In the end, however, we must 
remember that the common law’s fecundity is not solely a matter of judicial preference. The 
common law is also moved by the arguments that are put to the courts. In this sense, courts are 
reactive deliberative actors. As Allan has argued, the common law constitution is constituted 
by internal ‘interpretative’ argument.99 Each of us must engage in moral and political argument 
to determine the contours of constitutional principles and fundamental rights, to construct the 
law that we have in common. It is thus a shared and discursive undertaking. It is now time for 
workers to reclaim the common law as their own. UNISON represents a remarkable opportunity 
for workers, trade unions and their legal advisers to put the common law constitution to work, 
guided by the needs of the labour movement and working people.  
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